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Ultra ITires.
--000--
Ultra Vires is the term used to designate those ac-
tions of a corporation beyond the powers, express or im-
plied, which are conferred upon it by its charter or the
statutes under which it was instituted. Ultra Vires
could not be predicated of a common law corporation; it was
the original idea that a corporation, subject to the few
formalities prescribed as cenditions precedent to action,
was endowed with the same rights and subject to the same
liabilities as individuals.
Of course, at first, very few corporations existed
except for municipal and religious purposes, but as from
time to time, in later years, the institution of corpora-
tions was extended to other and more general purposes, it
became necessary for the public goodto restrict their
powers to narrower limits, which was done whenever exped-
ient, by stat ctmen cts contrary to these
len, F ttuory enacte4
------------- --------------------------------------------
4JSee 19 lHen.TVII.c.7, which was aimed at trading corpora-
statutes were mala prohibita, not ultra vires. But it
soon became impracticable to enact general laws prohibiting
corporations from exercising certain enumerated powers, for
the necessity to restrain became so frequent and arose in
such diverse and unexpected ways, that to mention expressly
what was forbidden would have occupied entirely too much
space in the statutes. At the same time, both in this
country and in England, commercial activity and gigantic
manufacturing enterprises were calling into being corpora-
tions for every conceivable purpose. A new method of
'governing them was therefore devised-statutes were made
to take the place of the common law. Hereafter corpora-
tions were to be statutory creations, and their powers were
to be limited and prescribed by their charters and the acts
under which they were incorporated. The change came aboit
sooner in America than in England. As early as 1802, in
the case oflead v. The Providence Insurance Co..,Chief Juf,-
tions and prohibited under a penalty of forty pounds, the
enactment of by-laws which might affect the interest of the
crown or the people's good.
P4I2 Cranch,127.
tice Marshall says:"IlWfithout ascribing to this body-which.,
in its corporate capacity, is the mere creature of' the act
to which it owes its existence-all the qualities and dis-
abilities annexed by the common law to ancient corporations
of this sdtt, it maV be said to be precisely what the in-
corporating act has made it, to derive all its powers from
that act and to be capable of exercising its faculties
only in the manner which that act authorizes'. "With
these bodies which have only a legal existence, the act of
incorporation Is an enabling act. It gives them all the
power they possess. It enables them to contract, and
when it prescribes to them a mode of contracting, they must
observe that mode, or the instrument no more creates a con-
tract than if the body had never b--en incorporated."
The change is now complete. At firstwhatever corporate
privileges were found inconsistent with the public good
were expressly prohibited by statute. Now whatever is
unauthorized by the real intent and spirit of the law cre-
ating the corporation, the courts hold to be impliedly pro-
hibited by the rule of statutory construction. To these
unauthorized acts the courts give the name of ultra vires.
The doctrine is thus the creature purely of judicial decis-
ion, and affords perhaps the most remarkable instance in
the history of English jurisprudence of the making of the
law by the judges. It was originated by the courts upon
grounds of public policy and commercial necessity and to
meet and provide for circumstances which called for the in-
tervention of some strong hand, but for which the state had
not directly provided. In New York, however, ultxa ,vires
rests, at present, on a statutory basis. The doctrine as
enforced through a long line of judicial decisions has been
at last tersely and clearly stated in the Revised Statutes,
wherein it is declared that 'in addition to the powers enum-
erated,........ and to those given in its charter, or in the
act under which it is or shall be incorporated, no corpora-
tion shall possess or exercise any corporate powers, except
such as shall be necessary to the exercise of the powers so
enumerated and given."
It will be seen also from what has been said, that,
the doctrine of ultra vires is of recent origin. As
used in the discussion of legal subjects, the phrase is
probably first found in Lord Kamd's "Principles of Equity',
published originally in 1776. His words are, 0A princi-
ple in logics that, will without power cannot produce any
effect, is applicable to matters of law and is thus ex-
pressed, that a deed ultra. vires is null and void.'
Its appearance as a distinct fact and principle in the le-
gal system of England dates, Mr. Brice tells us, from about
the year 1845, though the doctrine was announced from the
bench in America somewhat sooner, owing to the earlier use
of corporations here. The question first arose in a
dispute between the shareholders themselves, in an action
by the minority to restrain the majority from engaging in
acts which they claimed to be unauthorized by the charter.
From disputes of this nature the courts went farther to mat-
tere which involved the rights of outsiders, and at last
the doctrine was extended to transactions of every descrip-
tion where doubts could be raised as to the business pecu-
liar to corporations or the special powers, express or im-
plied, belonging to them. As a result it has been car-
ried to extreme limits, even as far as to releive a corpor-
ation from a contract of which it may have had the full
benefit O) At the very outset it overturned the old time-
honored maxim of the common law that 'a man cannot stultify
himself', and allowed corporations to plead their own inca-
pacity whenever it was inconvenient for them to carry out
their engagements. It next came in conflict with the
well established equitable maximsthat 'he who seeks equity
must do equity', and 'he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands', and refused to allow them to be applied
to corporations--a course of reasoning which allowed a
(O)Balfour v. Ernest 5 O.B.N.S. 61, 28 L.J.C.P., "170; Ernest
v. Nicholls, ,6 _H.Lds.-401; Atneneum Life Assurance Co. v.
Pooley 3 D.G.& J. 294, 28 L.J.(Ch.) 119.
corporation to keep the benefits of a contract, yet refuse
to perform its part of the a'qreement . Delay even for a
quarter of a century has been held to be no bar to the plea
of ultra vires i ) Besides these anomalies, there was the
uncertainty which followed the application of the doctrine
itself, when there were no statutes and no accepted decis-
ions to stand upon. So much rested with each judge that
it was almost always impossible to predict whether a cer-
tain transaction would be held ultra vires or not. The
reports are full of decisions absolutely irreconcilable,
given upon similar statement of facts. Such was the
condition and tendency of the law of ultra vires until
within the last few years. The injustice resulting from
its application, and the confusion of the decisions and
h as
dicta, called down upon it the illwill of almost the entire
A
profession. Mr. Brice speaks of it as being, if not an
excrescence upon, a very disturbing element in,the legal
.---------------------------------------------------------
(eqSpakman v. Evans E.R. 3 H.Lds. 171.
8system of the country. Judges have called it "an ung'ra-
cious", an unseemly", "an ignoble defence" shocking to
the moral sense" etc. But modern judicial legislation
has done away with most of its objectionable features.
These will be noted as we proceed.
There are three classes of cases which may be arranged
under the head of Ultra Vires, the principle of classifica-
tion bninr in the different parties to the suit. The
first class embraces those cases in which the question
arises on the application of stockholders, or corporators,
to restrain the corporate agents from applying corporate
funds to purposes foreign to the objects of incorporation.
The second embraces those cases in which the question
arises in an action between the corporation and the other
contracting party to enforce Derformance or recover damages
from the party in default. The third, embraces those
cases in which proceedings are brought by the sovereign
power to annul the charter for an abuse of the powers
Granted. These will be considered in their order.
(1.) The principle of majority rule lies at the very
foundation of corporations-the convenience and necessity
of this form of government in large bodies of associated
capitalists is one of the incentives which has led to the
formation of corporate bodies. The minority is bound by
the acts of the majority. To this the stockholder consents
by becoming a member of the corporation, because he is pre-
sumed to know the law and the rights of the majority by the
law. But this democratic or representative principle,
fundamental though it is, does not apply to an act or acts
of the majority unauthorized by the charter or constitu-
tional articles of incorporation and inconsistent with the
object and purpose with which the corporation was organized,
The stockholder can not be presumed to have anticipated or
thought that such acts would ever be perpetrated or attempt-
ed. And so courts have always held that a single share
holder can restrain a corporation from diverting the corpor-
ate funds from the purposes for which they were originally
intended, and prevent any ultra vires act on the part of
a majority of the shareholders or the agents of the corpor-
ation. The doctrine was first promulgated in America
in 1820 in Livingston v. Lynch, and again later in 1843
('4/4 Johns. Ch. 57?.
in Hartford & New Haven R.R.Co. v. Oroswell.O These cases
were the first to establish clearly that any ultra vires
act on the part of the directors or a majority of the stock-
holders is a breach of contract between the corporation and
each of its shareholders, for which the aggrieved party may
demand redress. This doctrine has been followed by a
long line of decisions extending down to the present time.o
Thus a shareholder in a railroad corporation may enjoin the
carrying out of an ultra vires lease of the roador the
performance of an illegal contract.(d A stockholder in a
manufacturin company may object to the corporation's en-
terin into enterprises different from those originally
contemplated in the charterJO/ A court may interfere at
the suit of a minority when the majority seeks to appro-
priate the assets of the company or to obtain for themselves
advantages not shared by the minorit.(4f A majority of the
(aJ5 Hill 38s. (0'ee 83 Barb.584 for cases on this point;
also 110 N.Y. 519 at 520. LaThomas v. R.R.Co., 101 U.S. 71;
Troy & Boston PR.Co. v. Boston &c. Pl'way Co., 86 T.Y., 107;
Mills v. Central PR. Co., 41 N.J.Eq. 1. (ajSanford v. R.R.
Co., 24 Penn.St., 378. (?31 Minn. 140; 93 Blatchf. 517;
11 Daly,273. (6J52 Ga.,276.
stockholders can not, as against a dissenting stockholder,
sell out the corporate property wbich i esgential to the
continuance of the business of the corporation or the pay-
ment of the corporate debtsg4a It is extremely doubtful
if a majority can even effect a dissolution unless the cor-
poration is an unprofitable and failing enterprise.d1 A
minority can prevent a consolidation with another corpor-
ation, unless the charter expressly confers upon the comp-
any the right to consolidate.&J A stockholder can bring a
suit to compell resistance on the part of the corporation
to an unjust tax; and to restrain a water company from fur-
nishing water to a city free of charges; he may brin(i a suit
in behalf of a corporation against an officer of the cor-
poration for fraudulent misappropriation and conversion of
corporate property when the corporation refuses to bring
such action.4f)
------------------------------------------------------
Wibbot v. Am.Hard Rubber Co.,33Barb.578. (4Lauinan v. Le-
banon Valley RR.Co.,SO Pa.$t.,42. (C2Clinch v. Financial
Corporation,b.R. 5 ER.460 . 1AJDodge v. Woolsey,19 HoW.331o
(CHowes v. Oakland,104 U.S.450. (f Graves v. Gouge,69N.Y. 1p
But while it is true as a general rule that a majority,
however large, can not in an ultra vires act, bind a single
dissenting shareholder, still there are certain exceptions
which are as certain and reliable as the rule itself.
If the shareholder has once ratified the ultra vires act,
or done any thing which amounts to a ratification, he will
not be allowed thereafter to complain against the corpora-
tion. A shareholder has been refused his remedy on the
ground that his application came too late, his laches hav-
ing lost him the right he originally possessed. Fair
dealing and good conscience obviously require the complain-
ants to assert their right at the outset, if it is designed
ever to do so.62Z Other acts than delay amount to ratifica-
tion. Where the plaintiff had with full knowledge re-
ceived his profits as shareholder under the agreement, his
bill afterwards filed was dismissed.h But it may be said
that where the legislature has expressly prohibited the do-
(aErie R'way Co. v. D.L.& W.Co.,21 N.J.Eq.,283
(Cb2 Johns.& Hem. 80,(2)
Ing of an act by an incorporated company, any contract to
do it is illegal, and the illegality may be set up as a de-
fense, though every share holder has assentert.&Joj Such is
the rule in England and in this country. But where an
act is simply Implie4ly prohibited in the charter the ques-
tion is not so clear. In the United States, with the
single exception of Maryland, the doctrine seems to be that
such acts may be ratified.(C/
(2.) The doctrine originally laid down in cases of
this class was this: all ultra vires contracts, being un-
lawful, are void, and the derense is available equally to
the corporation and to the other party to the contract.
This was so, not because the defense was considered a mer-
itorious one nor from any equity supposed to exist in favor
of the party pleading it, but because the other party was
presumed to have notice of the powers of the corporation
---------------------- ------------------------------------
LaL.R.9 'Exch.Ca. 379. ( O 21 How. 441; 8 Gill.,% J. 248;
42 Md. 581. (CIComstock's opinion in Bissel v. PR.Co.,
22 N.Y. 289, reo&nied in 63 N.Y. 62.
and the court would not lend its process or employ Its ma-
chinery in the aid of one who had been equally concerned
with the corporation In the act of disobedience to its pre-
cepts. It was held, as Judge Selden in his dissenting
opinion in the case of Bissel v. RR.Co. shows ana 'bV a long
line of Enqlisb and American citations tries to uphold,
that acts outside the authority given by the corporate
charters were illegal and void, and the broad principle,
that one may always set up the illegality of his own con-
tract in defense of an action upon it, was applied without
limitation to ultra vires acts of corporations.L 1 But it
is along this line of cases that the deviation from the or-
iginal doctrine is most marked.
The earliest limitation put upon the general rule is
this:- where the transaction is complete and nothing re-
mains to be done by the party seeking relief, the plea of
ultra vires is not available by the defendant corporation
2)2 N.Y. 258 at 281.
in an action brought against it for nonperformance of its
side of the contract. The first case touching upon this
point is that of Silver Lake Bank v. North, decided by
Chancellor Kent in 1820I ,) After stating the defenf.e, he
says: 'If this objection was strictly true in point of fact
I should not readily be disposed to listen to it." In
Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, Oomstock, C.J., sayg: 'There
is no doubt a principle of the common law, that illegal and
lu '-eso
Acontractslare void, without beingaexpresslY declared by any
statute. But there is also another principle, equally
well ascertained and more beneficial in its results, that
no party shall set up his own illegality or wrong to the
prejudice of an innocent person. He can set it up when
the legislative power not only forbids to make the contract,
but declares it to be void. But the logic of the law and
certainly its morality, are not opposed to the doctrine
that the legislature may prohibit the contract and punish
(gJ4 Johns.Ch. 370. h) 21 N.Y. 490-5.
the guilty parties, and yet leave the contract to stand in
favor of innocent persons not included in the terms of the
prohibitions." In Whitney Arms Company v. Barlowaqhe
leading case on the doctrine of ultra vires as it stands
in this state to-day, Allen, J.,after reviewing the case
and conceding that the acts were unauthorized by the char-
ter, says: 'It would be contrary to the first principles of
equity to allow such a defense to prevail in an action by
the corporation ........ It is now very well settlea that
a corporation can not avail itself of the defense, when
the contract has been in good faith fully performed by the
other partV and the corporation has had the full benefit of
the performance and of the contract. If an action can
not be brought directly upon the agreement, either equity
will grant relief, or an action in some other form will pr-
vail . ............ The plea of ultra. vires should not, as a
general rule, prevail, whether interposed for or against a
eorporation, when it would not advance justice, but, on the
(")6- N.Y. 62.
contrary, would accomplish a legal wrong.* This opinion
has ben repeatedly cited in the later New York cases-the
exact words last quoted being used in the Rider Raft Co.
v. Poach.) The doctrine is followed also in Woodruff v.
Erie R'way Coi.band in several supreme court cases.(C) In
Jourdan v. Long Island RP.Co., decided in 1889, Judge Dan-
forth says: "Moreover the defendant received a pecuniary
benefit under the contract, upon the assumption that the
contract was valid. If they intended to disavow it, it
was there duty to be active in so doing and not remain will-
fully passive in order to profit by an omission or mistake
on the Part of their own officers . ....... One party cannot
say 'I have got all I bargained for', and without liability
repudiate the mutual obligation which enabled it to do so,
and formed the consideration of the bargain. One promise
was the consideration for the other, and together they con-
stituted a binding agreement." The older New York cases
--------------------------------------------- -------------
(a97 N.Y. 378. 4) 93 N.Y. 609. Q/Rome Savings Bank
v. Kramer 32 Hun. 270; Negley v. Counting Room Co.,1 N.Y.S.R
298; Watts Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 21 N.Y.S.R,. 136.
/t1l5 N.Y. 380
hold to the same doctrine. In Parish v. Wheeler1Com-
stock, C.J., says that 'the executed dealings of corpora-
tions must be allowed to stand for and against both parties,
when the plainest ruies of good faith require it.' In
Palmer v. LawrenceJudge Duet lays down the proposition in
still more comprehensive terms. Steam Navigation Co. v.
Weed is to the same effect.k! In most of the other states
the same view is taken.L(Z) In Oil Creek & Alleahanv River
Co. v. Pa. Trans. Cd., Paxom, J., said: 'We do not think
the defendants are in a position to defend upon the ground
of illegality of the contract. There were mutual cov-
enants and mutual advantagfes. The defendants had enjoy-
ed the advantages such as they were. To the extent of
the demand in this suit the contract was executed, and to
say now that it was ultra vires, comes with an exceedingly
bad grace from the defendants. It may be that having
C4)22 N.Y. 494. 6b) 3 Sanf. 161. (CVe Hill 378.
(AJ13 Gray 124; 2 Stock (N.J.) 177; 16 Mass. 94; 30 Pa.St.20s;
3 Oregon 189; 55 Mo. 233; 44 Iowa 239; 11 Wall. 459; 12 Wall.
358. Ce) 83 Pa.St. 160.
shown performance on their part, they would have a right
to rescind the contract as to future transactions upon the
Ground of its illegality. Upon that point we express no
opinion. But there is no rule of law which permits them
to retain both the benefits and the price."
It will be seen from these decisions that it is the
general rule that a corporation which has entered upon and
enjoyed the benefit ot a contract for a long period of time
can not thereafter interpose the plea of ultra vires when
sued upon the contract.AI! Still there is one exception to
this general statement. The party contracting. with &
corporationl is at all times presumed to have notice of the
charter and powers of the corporation. When, therefore,
the nature of the act to be performed is such that it is
manifesti, on Its face, unauthorized by the charter, he
of an ultra vires act
can not enforce performanceA by the corporation, even though
he has himself performed his covenant. In such a case the
plea of ultra vires by the corporation will prevail. He
(/42 Hun., 496.
is considered to be in pari deZicto with the corporation
itself and the law will leave him in the same condition
in which it found him.(6)
And it makes no difference whether the defence of
ultra vires is set up by the corporation itself, or by the
other contracting party. The party contracting with the
corporation has recognized its existence and its capacity
to contract, and has thereby estopped himself from assert-
inq, in his own behalf, the inability of the corporation
to enter into the contract to which he voluntarily became
a party.OJ In Whitney Arms Company v. Barlow, cited above
as being the leading case on the doctrine of ultra vires,
the judge says: OHe who has received from a corporation
the full consideration of his engagement to pay money
either in services or in property, cannot avail himself of
the objection that the contract thus fully performed by the
-----------------------------------------------------------
( 2)lexander v. Cauldwell, 88 N.Y. 480; Conselvea v. Blan-
chard 103 N.Y. 222; Jamieson v. Citizens' Savinas Bank,
44 Hun.412. (b) Worcestor Medical Institute v. Harding
i Cush.,285; Cochran v. Arnold 58 Pa.St.,399; Black River
?, Utica RP..Co. v. Clarke 25 N.Y.,208; 62 Mo.,247; 57 Ind.60,
corporation was ultra vires . ....... If the other party
has had the benefit of a contract fully performed by the
corporation, he will not be beard to object that the con-
tract and performance were not within the legitimate pow-
ers of the corporation." This case was cited as decisive
of a similar point raised in the Diamond Match Company v.
Poeber, decided in 1887, and is the generally accepted doc-
trine throughout the country.@i
But there is :till a class of cases which comes under
this head, in which either party may always make use of the
plea of ultra vires. This class embraces actions upon con-
tracts purely executory on both sides. In Whitney Arms
Company v. Barlow, cited above, the court says: "Did the
question now made arise upon an application bV the stock-
bold.rs and corporators to restrain the corporate aqents
from applyingf corporate funds to purposes foreign to the
corporationror enqaqing in business outside of that for
which the company was formed, or on proceedings by the
--------------------------------------------------------
LcZ}106 W.Y.,q47S.
sovereign power to annul the charter for an abuse of the
powers granted, or in a proceeding to enforce and foe the
performance of an 6xecutory contract, where, upon reci-
sion or annulling the agreement, both parties would have
the same position as if no contract had been made, the
rules of decision would be different from those which must
prevail in the present action.. In either of the cases
suggested it is very likely the courts would be compelled
to give full effect to the objection and hold the business
unauthorized and a violation of the charter, and a forfei-
ture of the chartered rights and the contract null, and
refuse to perform it or give effect to it."
In Bradley v. Ballard;ustice Laurence says: 'It is
said by counsel for complainant, that a corporation is not
estooped to saF, in its defence, that it had not the power
to make a contract sought to be enforced against it, for
the reason that if thus estopped, its powers might be in-
definitely enlarged. While the contract remains unexecuted
,Aj55 Ill. ,413.
on both sides this is undoubtedly true, but when, under
cover of this principle, a corporation seeks to evade pay-
ment of borrowed money, ....... it is pressing the doctrine
of ultra vires to an extent that can never be tolerated.,
In Thompson v. Lambert, the court states the doctrine still
more stronalvj") His words are: 'As we understand the rule,
ultra vires prevails in full force only where the contracts
of corporations of this character remain wholly executory.
0
There is another tendency of the courts which has had
the effect of limiting the application of the doctrine of
ultra vires in this class of cases, -it is seen in the
greater liberality employed in behalf of the corporation
in the interpretation of the charter and the enabling acts.
Not only ar( corporations allowed all powers given by the
charter, but the power to make all such contracts as are
necessary and usual in the course of business, or are rea-
sonably incident to the objects for which a private corpor-
&tion is created is implied, where there is no positive
------------------------------------------------------ 
---(aZJ44 Iowa 239.
restriction in the charter. Thus a corporation may lease
or mortgage property lawfully held by it under its charter,
and not immediately n(eded for its own business.tO)A cor-
poration -.stablished for the purpos o' manufacturing and
seilling glass may contract to purchase glassware to keep
up its own stock and supply customers while its factory
is underqoina repairs.J) A corporation authorized to erect
dams for the purpose of holding water power, may sell its
real estate when the water power has been legally extin-
guished, and as part of the contract agree to raise the
grade of the lands sold..4 A railroad corporation may agree
to transport as a common carrier over connecting lines,
goods entrusted to it for carriage over its own line. /
A corporation with the power of 'discounting" paper, may
go into the market and buy negotiable instruments at less
than face value.bJ These and many other implied powers
the courts have allowed to corporations, and this tendency
L/131 Mass.,271. C,5Atlantic Bank &c. v. Savery 82 N.Y.291.
to read into the charter every power wbich could possibly
be of use to the corporation has very considerably lessen-
ed the numbr of ultra vires cases in the courts.
(S.) Concerning action, brought by the state to take
away the privileges granted to a corporation in its char-
ter much miqht be said, but the subject can only be touched
upon lightly here.
The idea that a corporation may be disolved has been
familiar to English law from the earliest times. It was
a common occurence during the reign of' Edward the First
and the succeeding reigns for proce edings to be instituted
by the crown against corporations for misusing their fran-
chises or arTainst individuals for usurping such privileges.
Looking at the English reports in the time of' Richard III.,
one would be led to believe that a good part of his reign
was devoted to contests of this sort. The manner in which
a forfeiture of a franchise was enforced was by a writ of
quo ioarrato, which gradually went out of use and an infor-
mation in the nature of a quo zoarran to, at the suit of the
lkttornev-general was substituted in its place. This lat-
ter proceeding is still in use in many of the states, but
in New York it has been abolished and superseded by a reg-
ular code action.
The right of a corporation to exist, and its author-
ity to conduct the business for which it was instituted
are granted subject to the conditions that the privileges
and franchises conferred upon it shall not be abused or
so employed as to defeat the ends of incorporation. When
so abused or misemployed, the state may withdraw or reclaim
the privileges granted. Although no such condition be ex-
pressly stated in the charter, nevertheless it is necessar-
ily implied with every grant of corporate powers.
Broadly stated this is the basis of all actions
brought by the state to annul the charter of a corporations
But as to what constitutes sufficient misuser to warrant a
forfeiture the courts do not always agree. As a general
rule it may be said that there must be wilful abuse or im-
proper neglect. Usually something more than mere acciden-
tal negligence or mistake in the mode of' exercising a power
is necessary. If, however, it is a material act, in con-
nection with which neglect is alleged, bad or corrupt mo-
tives need not be Dresent; it is sufficient if there is
neglect alone.ia') At the same time a substantial perform-
ance of the requirements of the chart)r is all that is re-
quired.,ZJ The courts will not, where a franchise has been
fairly and expressly granted, resort to narrow or forced
constructions, in order to establish a forfeiture, but any
material deviation may be fatal.tJ A bank failing to redeem
its notes which it has put into circulation forfeits its
charter. A hospital which, under a prior a-reement, used
part of an appropriation from the state to compensate an
attorney for superintending the bill through the legisla-
ture was held guilty of such an abuse of its powers as to
(4!Peo. v. Kingston Arc.Turnpike Co. 23 Wend.,193. O-4--+.
tiPeo. v. Broadwvay Rl.Co. 56 Hun.,45.
warrant a forfitiire of its charter.(a2A Bank which assigns
so much of its corporate property to trustees for thr! pay-
ment of' debts as to prevent the resumption of banking bus-
iness, forfeits its charter.&)b A manufacturing corporation
which with other corDorations and individuals entered into
and gave control of the business to a trust association in
order to prevent competition and raise the price of its
products was dissolved in an action brought for that pur-
pose by the state.(e, But misuser itself will not work a for-
feiture, the regular decree of a court having jurisdiction
is necessary. It is well settled also that questions of
forfeiture can-not arise collaterally. In the matter of
N.Y.Elevated PR.Co., Earle, J., says: "A cause of forfeit-
ure cannot be taken advantage of or enforced against a cor-
poration collaterally, or incidentally, or in any other
mode than by a direct proceeding for that purpose against
the corporation.'A
------------------------------------------------------------
CaJPeo. v. Dispensary cr Hospital Soc.&c.,17 Lansing 304.
L4)Peo. V. President &C. of Bank of Hudson, 6 Cawan, 217.
(CJPeo. v. North. River Sugar Refining Co. 54 Hun.,354.
aQ70 NT.Y. 3-7-8 .
30
Whether the stato must prove actual injury or not is
a question on which the cases are not uniform.d The better
doctrine and that prevailing in New York is that the state
must prove damages. Judge Papallo, in Peo. v. Williams-
burgh Turnpike Co., sIys: "Injury to the public is as es-
sential an ingredient to the right of action as the devia-
tion from the statute.'"&)
From this short and rather hasty review of the cases
on ultra vires, we may deduct these three propositions:
(1) That a single shareholder, or a minority of share-
holders, can restrain the corporation from commiting any
ultra vires act, unless there has been an express or im-
plied acquiescence on the part of the complaining party.
(2) That in contracts between the corporation and other
parties the plea of ultra vires is available only when the
contract is executory on both sids---subject to the single
taVCommercial Bank v. State,6 Smedes &i Marsh (Miss.) 59;
(ca peo. v. iTilliamsburqh Turnpike Co.47 N.Y.,586.
'_J47 N.Y.,595.
exception that the other party can not plead the incapacity
of the corporation in his own behalf where the nature of
the contract is such, on its face, that he might have known
that it was unauthorized under the charter, the terms of
which he is at all times presumed to know.
(,) That the state, for any material and damaging vari-
ation on the part of the corporation from the powers given,
may revoke its grant and annul the charter.

